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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004450

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [PTER](#) [PINS](#) [TU](#) [SY](#) [IZ](#) [IR](#)  
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S DECEMBER 4 MEETING WITH IRAQI  
NATIONAL SECURITY MINISTER

REF: BAGHDAD 4371

Classified By: Ambassador Khalilzad, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

11. (S) Summary: In a December 4 meeting with the Ambassador, Iraqi Minister of State for National Security Shirwan Wa'ili discussed a draft law to make the Ministry of State for National Security (MSNS) a regular Ministry; Wa'ili envisions one cabinet level official would coordinate and channel all intelligence information to the PM. Wa'ili downplayed his ties to Iran and claimed he had been frank in meetings with Iran's Ambassador. Wa'ili told the Ambassador the GOI is drafting a MOU on security relations with Syria, encompassing Iraqi fugitives in the Syrian border; logistical support coming from inside Syria to terrorists and insurgents; Arab infiltrators held by Syria; and Syrians held in Iraq. Wa'ili explained plans for Makhmour refugee camp, which are awaiting the PM's approval. Wa'ili claimed the Kurdistan Regional Government has promised to prevent entry and exit in the Qandil area, where PKK camps are located. End Summary.

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The Future of Iraq's National Security Ministry  
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12. (S) Wa'ili noted that Iraq's Council of Ministers has approved a draft law to make the Ministry of State for National Security (MSNS) a full ministry; he hoped the Council of Representatives (CoR) would give the draft its first reading this week. The law would put the ministry on par with the Ministries of Defense and Interior, he said.

13. (S) The Ambassador told Wa'ili there are some concerns on the U.S. side that the draft legislation gave the security service more of a role than is consistent with a democratic society. The Ambassador said he would follow up and give Wa'ili an in-depth analysis at a later meeting. Wa'ili said he was going to brief CG Casey and MNSTC-I Commander LTG Dempsey as well. Wa'ili said Iraq's Constitution clearly delineates the different roles of security services and the judiciary, and said he is committed to a neutral, professional national security infrastructure. Wa'ili claimed he is making sure all sects are represented in the MSNS.

14. (S) The Ambassador asked Wa'ili about MSNS relations with the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS). Wa'ili said he meets and shares information with INIS. The Ambassador noted that there is an impression that MSNS is too close to Iran; ministries should be Iraqi, not anyone else's.

15. (S) Wa'ili said he has heard the same rumors. He told the Ambassador he has only been to Iran once, for an economic conference after Saddam's toppling. Wa'ili claimed he had been frank in two meetings with Iran's Ambassador, telling

him about Iranian "infringements." Wa'ili said he had received an invitation to visit Iran two months ago that he has not yet accepted; he has prepared a report about the problems in Iraqi governates bordering Iran in the event he goes.

¶16. (S) The Ambassador asked Wa'ili's views on Iraq's future intelligence architecture. Wa'ili noted that Iraq, like most countries, has different agencies for different tasks, but it is critical to link together different intelligence agencies into one channel to the PM. Wa'ili said he envisions a cabinet-level official who would serve this function.

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Iraq/Syria Security Relations  
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¶17. (S) The Ambassador asked Wa'ili about Iraq's next steps on Syria after Syrian FM Muallem's visit. Wa'ili said the PM was "very frank" with Muallem, telling him that 60 to 70 percent of the bloodshed in Iraq is due to Syria. After the meeting, Wa'ili said the PM had tasked a GOI committee, of which he is a member, with drafting a MOU on Iraqi/Syrian security relations. According to Wa'ili, the GOI draft is focusing on five areas:

-- The draft GOI MOU will propose a way to deal with different types of Iraqi fugitives in Syria, differentiating between those convicted of crimes, those with extant arrest warrants but not yet convicted, and Saddam associates.

-- It will attempt to deal with borders and entry points; Wa'ili told the Ambassador he has received approval for a

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suggestion to establish what he calls a "coordination center" (NFI) at the border.

-- Third, the MOU will address logistical support inside Syria for terrorists and insurgents; Wa'ili mentioned forged documents and explosives training.

-- Fourth, the MOU will address the problem of Arab infiltrators the SARG has detained; Muallem told the GOI Syria has detained 1400.

-- Finally, the MOU will address Syrians being held in Iraq, including by MNF-I.

¶18. (C) After the GOI draft MOU is complete, Wa'ili expects the GOI and SARG will meet to negotiate it. The Ambassador suggested that if the GOI is seeking an alternative to extradition to the GOI of Iraqi fugitives in Syria, the SARG could turn them over to MNF-I.

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PKK  
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¶19. (S) The Ambassador raised the issue of PKK activity in Iraq. Wa'ili said the Turks were very sensitive about this during the PM's November visit to Ankara; it was the very first topic PM Erdogan raised. Wa'ili, who also went on the visit, said he received a letter from GOT anti-PKK coordinator Edip Baser asking the GOI to close PKK offices, close Makhmour refugee camp and deal with PKK camps in and around Qandil Mountain. Wa'ili claimed the GOI has closed all PKK offices in Baghdad.

¶10. (S) On Makhmour, Wa'ili told the Ambassador he had met recently with the UNHCR, Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Interior Minister (and KRG representative to the trilateral process) Karim Sinjari, the Mosul governor, and local officials about the future of the camp (reftel). Wa'ili said the group decided that the Iraqi Second Division would search

the camp, and remove armed individuals and arms. Thereafter, there would be a census of the camp, and legitimate residents would be issued ID cards.

¶11. (S) Wa'ili said he is awaiting the PM's reaction to his Makhmour plan; KRG PM Nechirvan Barzani had agreed to it.

¶12. (S) Going after armed groups in Qandil is more difficult, Wa'ili said, due to the terrain. However, the KRG had pledged to not allow people to enter or leave the area. The next step, according to Wa'ili, is a trilateral meeting. The Ambassador noted that Baser refused to meet with Sinjari. Wa'ili replied that the PM felt the GOT should not tell the GOI whom to send. Wa'ili said Sinjari is bold and professional. The GOI will push the GOT to issue amnesty; a military solution to the PKK problem would be difficult.

¶13. (S) The Ambassador asked how the USG could help. Wa'ili suggested the USG join the GOI in pushing the GOT on amnesty. The Ambassador agreed that a purely military solution to the PKK problem is difficult, but explained Turkish sensitivities on the amnesty issue, telling Wa'ili Turkey is not yet ready for that step. More flexibility by KRG President Barzani would be helpful as well. Khalilzad